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ABSTRACT
Opinions on the impacts of China in Africa differ from one observer to the next, be it in
media, academic, or elsewhere. While most general discourses have been nuanced and coherent,
there is nevertheless a prevailing sentiment of unbridled fear and sinophobia, or anti-Chinese
populism. Based on a two-sided study in Ghana, this research uses Chinese-Ghanaian
employment relations as a way of entry to analyze and explore cross-cultural understandings, or
lack thereof, that leads to conflict. From there, this paper examines the style of politicized media
in broadcasting Sino-Ghanaian (Chinese-Ghanaian) engagements and its role in creating the antiChinese populism on the continent. Central to the culturally-grounded conflict is the lack of
mutual understanding in socio-cultural interactions experienced by both parties in each of their
distinct ways: punctuality, language, foreignness, vulnerability, and risk. This research fulfills
previous research gap and sheds light particularly on Chinese employers' existence in a foreign
environment and their financial and social risks, as well as vulnerability powered by the rising
anti-Chinese sentiment. As past studies on Sino-African engagement have often been limited to
large-scale aid, infrastructure, or manufacturing projects involving state-owned enterprises, this
research complements the ongoing academic conversation by investigating Chinese migrants
working as employers in the service and catering sector of Ghana and their interactions with
Ghanaian employees and the general public as it is the most common and prominent way of
social interactions between people of both cultures.

INTRODUCTION
China-Africa cooperation, or Sino-Ghanaian relations, has been in the spotlight of recent
global development discourse. Today, economic, social, and political development goals and

agendas are used as important tools for African countries to make progress towards political and
economic stability. Within the development trajectory, it is necessary for the country to have the
vision to invest and allocate resources in areas that are most fit and profitable. As opportunities
continue to emerge as a result of globalization, China has manifested onto the international
scene, providing a new development approach that apparently “exerts no political pressure” but
is based on investment and bilateral exchanges (Frimpong and Nubuor 2013:118). However,
multiple perspectives exist in regards to Chinese foreign policy towards African countries: while
some claim that it undermines the previous global effort to increase transparency and good
governance, others label Chinese policies as “neo-colonial”. Media often put the blame on
Beijing for disrupting local economy and crowding out local employment opportunities. As the
bilateral cooperation accelerates and intensifies, so has criticisms. The study concentrates on
Ghana, one of the earliest African countries to form diplomatic ties with China but also one with
increasing interaction with the eastern power. With increasing continental engagement comes a
creeping phenomenon of anti-Chinese sentiments, or “sinophobia”, in different communities and
economic sectors of Ghana (and other African countries) where financial and human capital
imported from China directly competes with local development efforts. Below the blanket of
global recognition and large-scale financial pledges are a large influx of Chinese migrant
laborers seeking for a different life to settle in Ghana due to Chinese domestic labor and financial
competition, as a result of the “going-out” policy. This research directly examines on-the-ground
Sino-Ghanaian interactions, particularly within the catering and service sector, which has been
crucial in laying the foundation of general Chinese-Ghanaian social interaction. It will
investigate how sinophobia permeates through the society and how its emergence holds

important implications for China as a rising global power and for Africa as a promising region of
the world for economic development through capital and expertise import.

History of Sino-Ghanaian Relations
Diplomatic relations between Ghana and China date back to 1960 when Kwame
Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party became the first leader of the country. As he began
to jumpstart his developmental plan for Ghana, especially in infrastructure building, the People’s
Republic of China became a supporter of Nkrumah’s socialist statist political agenda. Capital
came in from all aspects of the economy, including an interest-free loan repayable in Ghanaian
exports at $20 million in 1961, another $22 million pledge by Zhou Enlai in 1963-1964 (Aidoo
2016:56). Technical supports and military advisors were also introduced to help strengthen the
Ghanaian military infrastructure. It was not long before the Sino-Ghanaian relationship was put
on hold when Nkrumah’s administration was overthrown in a military takeover which lasted
from 1966 until 1972. Then, there was a drastic shift in focus when the two countries reestablished diplomatic ties: transformed from an engagement based on political ideologies into a
market-oriented economic relationship where Ghana both politically and economically upheld
the “One-China” policy. The policy requires partnering countries to recognize the People’s
Republic China as the only representation of China. Countries that recognize Taiwan as an
independent country are not eligible to receive Chinese investment and aid (Frimpong and
Nubuor 2013:118). Since then, a number of high profile Chinese officials have visited Ghana,
and each time, their visits were incentivized with infrastructure loans and market exploratory
missions to strengthen the bilateral relation (Aidoo 2016:56). Notably, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao’s seven nation-tour of Africa in 2007 led to the issuing of a joint communiqué on
strengthening Sino-Ghanaian cooperation in trade, infrastructure, telecommunications,

education, health, and culture. This visit also led to the signing of six agreements, which includes
a $66 million loan agreement to expand Ghana’s telecommunications network. This year, Ghana
President Akufo-Addo witnessed another eight Agreements signing on his visit to China.
Principal amongst the agreements lied a $2 billion Sino-Sure Framework Agreement, which
opens up infrastructure, road, and railway construction projects, enabled by Sino-Hydro
corporation, as part of Power China. Another $30 million in grant was committed by President
Xi Jinping to assist the secure implementation of President Akufo-Addo’s economic policies.
Furthermore, infrastructural projects such as Cape Coast Sports Stadium expansion, Jamestown
Fishing Port Complex, and the expansion project of the University of Health and Allied Sciences
in Ho are all part of China’s commitment to Ghana to finance construction to address the
country’s infrastructure deficit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration 2018).

Modern China-Ghana Trade Relations
The Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been in the spotlight for offering
a platform to enhance Sino-African development mechanisms and direct future investments, as
well as cultural educational exchanges and military cooperation. In 2015, China pledged $60
billion for new projects, and this price tag was matched again in 2018, with changes in its
distribution -- $20 billion in credit lines, $15 billion in grants, interest-free loans, and
concessional loans, $10 billion in special fund for development financing, and $5 billion for
special fund for financing imports from Africa. There is another $10 billion that will be
investment spread over the next three years, coming mostly from Chinese companies
(Benabdallah and Robertson 2018). Beijing’s vow to implement more sustainable projects
focusing on infrastructure development is echoed by African high officials, according to an
article published days after the FOCAC, quoting words such as “deeply transformational”,

“satisfied”, and “inspired” (Dahir 2018). Outstandingly, Ghanaian president Nana Akufo-Addo
declared his new found interest in China as a path for developmental growth. His agenda was
affirmed once again at the 73rd UN Assembly address, where he stated to transform the
development practices used by African countries over the years that have not yet yield the
desired rate of growth. He now looks to China to address the country’s infrastructure deficits.
While Ghanaian governmental elites have responded enthusiastically to China’s growing
presence within the country, this voice does not resonate well with the average Ghanaian, who
witnesses Chinese penetration into its market daily. Due to the increasing economic engagement
between the two countries, the benefits of Chinese investments are often eclipsed by a rising
competition with local businesses within the domestic market, and this competition often
overshadows China’s contribution. Moreover, there exitsts what Margaret Lee describes as
“globalization from below”. In her article, “Africa’s World Trade: Informal Economies and
Globalization from Below”, Lee sheds light on human trafficking, prostitution, and increasing
illegal mining activities in parts of the Ghana. Between criticisms and praises, there are also
questions raised that need to be answered. Is China’s bilateral strategy of development in Africa
really as bad as it often made to seem? What are the factors that contribute to the rising antiChinese sentiment in Ghana as well as on the continent? Facing such large-scale economic and
financial assistance, should Ghana be more aware of potential political repercussions and
implications that may come in the near future? This research focuses on Chinese-Ghanaian
employment relations from the perspectives of their power dynamics, cross-cultural
understanding that reaches beyond racially framed allegations, as well as culturally-grounded
outlooks on work ethics and employment relations. Additionally, politicized media discourses in
multiple perspectives will be examined to see how workplace conflicts are portrayed and

magnified in the media. Media, whether in print or digital, have been the primary outlet for
popularizing dialogues on the growing presence of China within the country. By examining the
role of the media and their responsibility in information dissemination on certain aspects of
Chinese-Ghanaian relations, we hope to understand how Sinophobia popularized on the
continent and how different dynamics of Sino-Ghanaian engagement can influence the broader
context of future Chinese investment in Ghana. Often, anti-Chinese sentiment in Africa reported
in the local media network enable and urge a growing sense of Sino-African pessimism without a
clear emphasis on the connivance of local actors, making reports biased, forming a tale of
foreign exploitation
Previous research has been able to address employer-employee relations, but not seeking
its impact on the overall bilateral relations. By interviewing Chinese migrant employers,
Ghanaian local employees, as well as general Ghanaians in multiple sectors of the economy, this
research will fill the research gap on on-the-ground Chinese-Ghanaian interactions in the service
sector and its implications on the grand scheme of Sino-Ghanaian relations, through the portrayal
of different platforms of media sponsored by a diverse narrative.

Methodology
This research is designed on the basis of data collection on both Chinese employers,
Ghanaian employees, people in the space in between, as well as general perceptions on the rising
presence of China in Ghana. Data is mainly gathered from semi-structured interviews and field
observations where field notes with thick description are produced. The qualitative aspect of this
study is important because one can better express oneself through verbal communication.
Nuances in employer-employee interaction can be better visually observed than analyzed and
coded through questionnaires.

The independent variable in this study is largely Sino-Ghanaian trade and investment.
This variable will not be numerically calculated but purely be based on the increasing
engagement between China and Ghana in light of recent political events and decisions. It is
assumed that this independent variable is experienced by all participants of this research, whether
directly (interaction with Chinese foreign nationals in Ghana through business interactions or
socially) or indirectly (through social media or word-of-mouth of others).
Perceptions of China, the dependent variable in this study, will be measured and analyzed
based on the semi-structured interviews. Similarly, the response from participants will also not
be numerically coded. Through interviews and observations, a specific sentiment will be felt or
verbally communicated. However, in both Chinese and English, there are certain vocabulary
with direct positive or negative undertone that can be used to make the argument of a shifting
perceptions on China by the Ghanaian community.
In addition to the independent and dependent variables, there are other secondary
variables that need to be taken into account. It will be selected and measured to discover whether
it modifies or strengthens the relationship of the independent variable to the dependent variable
or any observable phenomenon. It could also determine the extent to which the independentdependent variables’ relationship is influenced by secondary factors. In this study, the categorical
variable of gender (man and woman, assuming it is dichotomous), age, and class (socioeconomic
status) are the three most prominent factors in mediating the correlations between increasing
China-Ghana engagement and people’s wavering perceptions of China. The effect of these three
variables will be further discussed in the analysis section.

Limitations and Ethical Implications

It is important to recognize possible ethical implications as well as limitations to this
research. My physical appearance as a Chinese person might restrict or enhance the information
received depending on the interviewee. Chinese participant, whom I speak their native tongue to,
tend to feel more comfortable releasing certain information or using certain vocabulary in
Chinese that have a specific connotation that could not be directly translated into English,
nevertheless their overall sentiment could be observed. On the other hand, some might feel less
inclined to release information to me because they suspect my intention of research, especially
when there are conversations that involve discussing one’s involvement in illegal activities or
one’s strong opinion towards a political system. Both scenario therefore would restrict the
reception of information and data for my research. Therefore, it is important for me as a
researcher to both go through necessary explanations and introductions prior to interviewing
participants but also conduct debrief sessions to inform participants regarding confidentiality.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As “China-Africa relations” become an increasing motif in global development
discourse, many works have been done to examine various aspects of this newly emerging global
trade network: public policies, infrastructure deficits and development, employment and
workforce localization, local anti-Chinese resentment, and much more. For my literature review,
I selected articles that cumulatively present an overarching evaluation and encompass diverse
narratives on Sino-African relations.
Richard Aidoo (2016), in his article “The Political Economy of Galamsey and AntiChinese Sentiment in Ghana,” examines China’s engagement in Africa, particularly in the
dimensions of states, corporations, private and public ventures, individuals, and groups. He
mentions that the insertion of Chinese power in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) in

sectors such as manufacturing, construction, and natural resource extraction has lately shaped the
discourse of anti-Chinese sentiment, especially in illegal mining (galamsey). Moreover, Aidoo
depicts China’s strategy of maintaining gradual control of Ghana through loans and reflects on
the weakness of the Ghanaian government in their capability to maintain control in front of
Chinese power. The author is highly critical of Chinese private-owned enterprises' (POEs) FDI
for over-exploiting local natural resources, stealing local employment opportunities, and
disrupting the local state-citizen relationship. However, the surge of Sino-Africa pessimism in
the media has a lack of clear emphasis on the connivance of local actors, which makes
report/research a tale of neocolonialism, foreign exploitation of powerless and voiceless African
locals. While Aidoo might have articulated Chinese presence in Ghana in an overly negative
way, his article is nevertheless useful for my research because it reveals the issue of Chinese FDI
directly through the lens of the host country. It is important to notice that this article was
published in 2016, and there has been, since then, an increase in the effort to quell illegal
Chinese miners in Ghana. This article does not take into account China’s recent economic
investment pledges made at the 2018 Forum on China Africa Cooperation. Yet, the political and
economic ties between China and Ghana that Aidoo presents in his article have not altered much
since the time of its publication.
Decai Tang and K.B. Gyasi (2012) complement and further enhance Aidoo’s analysis on
Chinese FDI in Ghana. In their research, “China-Africa Foreign Trade Policies: The Impact of
China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Flow on Employment of Ghana”, Tang et al. describe
China’s development model as an “alternative to western style” and “prioritizes stability of
democracy” by “promoting product differentiation and competing in different market
mechanisms” (Tang and Gyasi 2012:553). The authors’ statistical data and graphs present a

remarkable steady increase in total local employment generation by Chinese companies that is
accompanied by an escalation in the amount of investment flow from China. Still, there is a
significant imbalance of sectoral penetration within the investment: Tang et al. discovered that
80% or more of investments from China have been mostly “concentrated in the Manufacturing,
Building & Construction and General Trade sectors of the economy of Ghana” (Tang and Gyasi
2012:557). Therefore, a more efficient allocation of resources is crucial in further upgrading
domestic operations. Though I concede that the article’s use of statistical data and graphs to
illustrate the changes in Chinese investment vs. total investment, sectoral breakdowns of
investment, as well as employment is fairly all-encompassing; I still insist that the authors’
statistical survey with limited geographical focus reveals a deficiency on this research’s ability to
reflect on each of the sectors within Ghana’s economy. Furthermore, there is a significant lack of
analysis in this paper for it to hold any ground in this space. This article could be used as
supplementary to Aidoo’s article, but it does not hold notable weight itself.
To further the dialogue on Chinese investment in Ghana and its impact of local
employment, Antoine Kernen and Katy N. Lam (2014) introduce the compelling concept of
“workforce localization” which stems from Chinese state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) high
autonomy due to the lack of management control from the Chinese central authority. This
contrasts dominant discourse on the China-Africa debate, where most argue that Chinese SOEs
are closely linked and manipulated by Beijing. In their article, “Workforce Localization among
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana,'' the authors effectively provide the
historical context behind China’s economic reform and its role in the internalization of Chinese
SOEs in Ghana. As well, Kernen et. al successfully evaluated workforce localization, in which
Chinese firms employ a large amount of local workforce, and its significance in certain sectors of

the economy as well as its overall impact. Despite researching under a similar topic, Kernen et.
al’s analysis is more persuasive because it is based on semi-directed interviews as opposed to
Tang et al. ’s research where they solely analyzed existing data on Ghana’s local employment
statistics produced by the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GINC). I fully endorse Kernen
et. al’s research approach because it is more flexible and human especially given the topic of
discussion where words and expressions hold more weight than a numerical value. The authors
conduct their analysis without bias, by evaluating the wins and losses of both parties equally.
They believe that workforce localization is a key element for successful internationalization, and
still remains one of the major weaknesses of Chinese companies. Kernen et. al explained why
workforce localization is important amongst Chinese SOEs – 1) cost saving because non-skilled
labor is cheaper domestically 2) required compliance to investment law (at least 10 Ghanaians
employee is needed for setting up a business by foreign investor in Ghana) 3) Business
reputation where Ghanaian foreman can ease communication barriers but also help increase
business reputation for future growth 4) training of local technicians and engineers which is
popular among telecommunication firms. As well, the authors thoroughly presented a strong
argument that integrated social, cultural, and historical contexts of the internationalization of
Chinese SOEs. While Aidoo focuses on factors that fuel sinophobia and Tang et. al (2012)
analyzes the fluctuations in statistical data on employment in Ghana as a result of Chinese
investment, Kernen et. al incorporated historical frameworks that influence investment decisions
and policies that regulate employment decisions. These three articles work together to pave a
strong background for my research, which will be based on the issue of employment and
employer-employee relations but with a widened angle to evaluate such relations’ implications
on a wavering public perception of China and its impact on future investment decisions.

Karsten Giese and Alena Thiel (2014) in their paper “The vulnerable other – distorted
equity in Chinese-Ghanaian employment relations” incorporate a two-sided ethnographic study
in Accra to analyze factors such as “psychological contract, cross-cultural equity expectations,
and foreignness” and their contribution to Chinese-Ghanaian employment relations (Giese and
Thiel 2014:1108). Giese et al. argue that both Chinese employers’ and African employee’s
perception of vulnerability and risk play a central role in their interactions: Chinese employers’
vulnerability lies in their risk to become victims of social and political conflicts that could
potentially jeopardize their investments whereas Ghanaian employees are, in comparison,
materially more vulnerable, younger, and marginalized socially. The authors’ work fills the
research gap of demonstrating how “mutual equity expectations are constructed under conditions
of foreignness and how perceived equity distortions are mediated and addressed when shared
normative frameworks are absent” (Giese and Thiel 2014:1103). Contrary to Kernen et al. 's
argument that Chinese companies hire Ghanaian employees for cost-saving, reputation-building,
and social communications, Giese et al. contend that the legal requirements behind employing
Ghanaians are regarded as a “big (financial) burden and politically imposed barrier to market
entrance” (Giese and Thiel 2014:1104). This difference will be compared to my own research in
the analysis section, as different sectors of investment require different degrees of social
interaction. Though I concede that Giese and Thiel (2014) devoted a lot of time and effort into
explaining reasons behind potential conflicts between Chinese employers and Ghanaian
employees, I still insist that their arguments are not backed by policy-driven evidence. It is too
psychological-based, and it makes me question the content's transferability to my research. It
does not take into account fundamental cultural differences in work ethics and appear to
surround its argument on psychological contracts and “cross-cultural exchange” relations. While

its argument on risk and vulnerability make sense to the extent of which dealing with foreigners
with a specific power dynamic impose certain risks on both parties, I struggle to support the idea
as an ultimate factor in contributing to existing conflicts between Chinese employers and
Ghanaian employees. Although there are dubious grounds regarding Giese and Thiel’s research,
I still acknowledge and appreciate their work and anticipate it would be of help in the analysis
section of my own research, especially the section where the authors discuss the tendency to
racialize employer-employee discourse because patterns of dissatisfaction and conflict which
other authors did not discuss in their research.
To further evaluate the Sino-Ghanaian relations within Chinese investment in Ghana, it is
important to go beyond the realm of employer-employee relations and examine African agency,
Chinese incentives, as well as other components that contribute to a rising anti-Chinese
sentiment within the country and on the continent. Samuel Kwadwo Frimpong and Savior
Ayertey Nubuor study China’s increasing penetration in global industrial markets and growing
presence in Ghana and reflect on its possible political repercussions by discussing issues within
this bilateral relation as well as external influences. In their article, “Research on the Chinese
Investments in Ghana” (2013), the authors review Sino-Ghanaian diplomatic relations since the
1960s and explore present day issues surrounding current Chinese investment decisions in
Ghana. Frimpong et al. did an excellent analysis focusing on China’s incentive entering the
Ghanaian market which was not discussed in any of my other literature review sources: their
investigation stems from China’s “one-China” policy and takes into account China’s diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. It focuses more on the political repercussions of such massive economic
and financial assistance. Many other journal articles on China’s engagement in Ghana or even
Africa only tend to reflect on activities by SOEs and private flagship companies; far less

attention has been paid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which “operate in a
variety of sectors, from informal street trading to farming to manufacturing” (Frimpong and
Nubuor 2013:120). SMEs cannot be overlooked because it is run by mostly Chinese migrants
who are now close to one million in population in Ghana. They have much more flexibility with
their stay, are not directly under the spotlight in Sino-Ghanaian engagement discourse, and
attract little interest from government and agencies of the West as well. In their conclusion,
Frimpong and Nubuor shed light on external (Western) accusations on China-Ghana trade
relations, whose importance cannot be undermined in this discussion, given Ghana’s colonial
past. I fully endorse the breadth of the authors’ analysis and appreciate their refreshing insight
which will be incorporated in my own analysis.
A highly-debated topic within the Sino-African relationship is the incentive behind
China’s engagement. The lack of transparency within the country’s political system makes
analysis and research difficult. However, Linh Tran Huy, in her article “China-Africa Relations:
At a Crossroads?” challenges the commonly portrayed idea of a one-sided Sino-African
relationship: as China’s presence on the continent rises, African companies and entrepreneurs are
seeking to expand overseas to China as well. This interesting Sino-African relationship was only
presented in this paper. Moreover, the author introduces an interesting relationship between
demographic shift on the two regions and its effect on their trade relationship: China has a
growing aging population while Africa’s fertility rates are high. Fewer jobs will be created in
China whereas more employment opportunities are in demand in Africa. China may have a
slightly lower demand for natural resources with a decreasing population, but the progression of
wages in China could result in an increase in consumption per capita due to lifestyle changes
which lead to a greater need for resources. Nevertheless, China is still increasing its investment,

particularly in the natural resources sector in African countries. This article is useful for my
research topic because it offers two unique perspectives on the relationship between
demographic shifts and natural resources demand in both Africa and China. It also shows the
point of view of Chinese businesses and the extent they will go towards investing in Africa.
China-briefing is not a state-owned media source, but they have been publishing information on
business intelligence, tax, and operational issues in China from a practical perspective. It
provides technical information to business executives and foreign investors. This magazine
article reveals the growing economic capabilities of African countries attributed by China’s
investment and projects the future of the Sino-African relationship for its target audience.
Overall, the literature incorporated in my research encompass a wide range of aspects in
regard to Chinese investment in Africa, particularly Ghana. There are many layers to SinoGhanaian social, economic, and political interactions. While many works have been done to
evaluate the economic and political aspects of diplomatic engagement, little work is done to
evaluate the shifting image of China on the continent. Given the importance of personal
interaction, I aim to use Chinese-Ghanaian employer-employee relations in the service sector as
a way of entry to examine factors that influence wavering perceptions of China in the country
and assess pre-existing and potential efforts needed to bridge the gap of misunderstanding and
misconception. This is intended to contribute closing a profound research gap concerning the
role of on-the-ground Chinese-Ghanaian physical interaction, given its inevitable social,
economic, and political power dynamic, and its influence on the overall sensitivity towards
Chinese presence in Ghana, but also Africa as a whole. This research format will also be
replicated in Beijing, with hopes of providing a dual perspective comparative research.
ANALYSIS

Chinese-Ghanaian Employer-Employee Relations
Within the last decade, China has emerged onto the global scene as the most ambitious and
aggressive actor in Africa by inserting its financial and human capital, culture, and trade to
reaching nearly every country on the continent. According to Mckinsey & Group’s 2017 report,
“Dance of the Lions and Dragons”, since the turn of the millennium, Sino-African trade has been
growing 20% annually with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rising at a faster rate of 40% (Sun,
Jayaram and Kassiri 2017). Ghana, in particular, has become Africa’s top supplier of students to
the country, with 6,500 nationals studying in China for a population of 28 million. Economically,
has surged to become Ghana’s top trading partner where bilateral trade rose from less than $100
million to $6.7 billion from 2000 to 2017 (Piling 2018). However, statistics and data often fail to
inclusively reflect on all aspects of Chinese economic penetration in Ghana. Particularly,
backbone companies, such as large-scale state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private flagship
companies, who are strategic partners in critical sectors such as resources and energy
development as well as significant infrastructure projects, are always accounted in figures and
data while the now over-one-million Chinese migrants working and living in Africa are often
disregarded. Respectively, the eruption of Sino-African engagement and academic studies
reflecting on China’s growing interests and expanding role in Africa has largely turned to focus
exclusively on large-scale projects. In fact, around 90 percent of the 10,000 Chinese-owned firms
operating in Africa today are privately owned (Sun, Jayaram and Kassiri 2017). This questions
the monolithic image of a state-centered investment that has been wrongly perceived by many.
This research, therefore, pays attention to the large number of Chinese SMEs, precisely those
operating in the service sector, and fulfills a previous research gap focusing specifically on

migrant Chinese nationals working as employers, interacting with local employees in the service
sector.
While the activities of private Chinese migrant workers embed little direct influence on
the overall government decisions in terms of future investments, they nevertheless hold
significant implications for workers and consumers in Ghana who see these Chinese immigrant
investors on a day-to-day basis. Their occupation in the informal sector has a much more explicit
impact on the local communities. Individual efforts may be too micro to even be taken into
account on the larger scheme of Chinese investment in Ghana, however, Chinese immigrant
entrepreneurs are forming a growing chain of commercial ties between China and any African
host countries: some export raw materials in demand in China, some import small consumer
goods to sell for a cheaper price in Ghana, and some become intermediaries linking Chinese
suppliers and Ghanaian consumers, or vice versa.

Chinese Migrant Workers: The Employers
Jobs in the service sector of the Ghanaian labor market, particularly those headed by a
Chinese employer, are usually those that require minimal or no training, which implies that these
low-responsibility jobs are rarely attached to high social status. Participating employees,
therefore, do not possess education degrees beyond high school. Occasionally, some have
vocational training in fabric printing or carpentry. Regardless of education level, most employees
were between twenty to thirty-five years old, and there was an even divide between genders.
Within the service sector of the local economy, most Chinese migrant investors choose to
participate in catering services, notably opening restaurants or small-scale grocery supermarkets.
From interviews, we learned that typical Ghanaian employment relationships, in general, are
characterized by power distances between the employer and the employee, and this dynamic is

generally demonstrated through loud talk, strict demands, and exercise of power that is largely
accepted as a norm and a necessity in the functioning of a business. Though Chinese migrant
workers are not as heavily influenced by the mechanisms within the Ghanaian labor space, they
are still informed by a similar logic of obligation and social power within the Ghanaian context,
based on their experience in China either as an employer or an employee.
Based on empirical evidence, the power that Chinese employers exude is often based on a
sense of frustration and vulnerability that stems from the sense of being a foreigner and a lack of
a normative framework that cohesively bring together this cross-cultural employment relation.
While there seem to be no strict laws enforcing small-scale private non-Ghanaian owned
restaurants hiring ratio, the incentive to hire Ghanaian employees is strong amongst all Chinese
owners. Unlike works in the technical or construction space where most companies bring skilled
Chinese workers in the beginning because 1) it takes time to build up a skilled-team 2) Chinese
workers can train Ghanaian workers until independence 3) possibility of avoiding local labor
issues in an unfamiliar socio-political context, those in the catering space tend to hire locals
mostly for cost-saving purposes. One participant, restaurant A, was operated by an entire family
that has emigrated to Ghana. The family business involves sisters and their partners as well as
the parents. The restaurant only opened for evenings and they served two simple dish – Chinese
hotpot and Chinese street barbeque, both of which do not require chefs in the kitchen. The simple
job was to wash and cut the food and serve as the customers will be doing the cooking
themselves. It seemed as if having 6 people working for a restaurant that seats about 30 would be
plenty, but nevertheless the owner decided to hire 3 extra Ghanaian help. When asked why, the
owner mentioned for a sense of security both economically and politically. Also, for the fact that
now that he is the boss, he wants to have people working under him that is outside his familial

network. This being said, most of the Chinese interviewees of restaurants of relatives were
convinced that with regard to the scale and simplicity of their business, they could operate
perfectly fine without hiring any local workers. Employing Ghanaians is therefore regarded as a
way to overcome specific political and economic barriers. Politically, the absence of a common
language makes communications difficult. Most Chinese migrant workers do not speak fluent
English until arriving in Ghana. Therefore, this lack of understanding becomes a source of work
inefficiencies and conflicts. At the restaurant A, where workers’ hours are 9AM-12PM for
produce preparation, and 3PM-9PM for serving and waitressing, all three employees were taught
basic Chinese terms on the menu for easy communications while all their other dialogues were in
English. The owner and his family mentioned their effort to learn English and speak it “the
Ghanaian way” when they first arrived, and over the past two years, they have been able to
improve and finesse their communications skill to a degree where conversing with the beer bottle
collectors and produce deliveries was no longer an issue. Despite all efforts made towards
embracing this linguistic gap, during my observation of having a sit-down meal with a fellow
Chinese friend at restaurant A, the frustration the mother-in-law (roughly 60 years of age)
towards one of the workers was clearly observable. While the Chinese owners of restaurant A
actively acknowledge the importance of maintaining a positive and special relationship with
local employees, they nevertheless still carried their frustrations visibly. One of the incidents
included a Chinese table of businessmen ordering a plate of sliced potatoes for their hotpot: they
ordered in Chinese and assumed that the Ghanaian waitress’ language proficiency would be
sufficient to understand simple names on the menu which she has been previously taught.
However, the plate was never delivered to the table and the incident concluded with the motherin-law of the owner yelling the name of potatoes in Chinese repeatedly to the waitress, at this

point which she turned to me, and said in Chinese “This girl, no matter how many times you
teach her something, she can never learn. She is slow in speed and slows in learning…” It is
important to note that such employment dynamic is also visible within the Chinese working
culture, based on my experience observing in Chinese restaurant settings in China. Calling an
employee derogatory terms such as “stupid”, “dumb”, or “slow”, at one point becomes
normalized within the power dynamics and relationship. While normalization does not make
such behavior ethically or politically correct, it still provides an explanation for some of the
actions employers project onto their employees, and it gives insight to the causes of potential
conflicts.

Theorizing Sino-Ghanaian Employment Relations
Within existing academic research, little effort has been afforded to cross-cultural
employment relations, and more recent work usually limit their scope to employee’s equity.
Therefore, very minimal attention has been paid to employers’ perspective in this interaction.

Lack of mutual cultural understanding
So what are some factors that contribute to the production of derogatory terms projected
from the employer? Theoretical and empirical findings suggest that cultural differences and the
absence of a shared normative framework are two major components that embody ChineseGhanaian employment relations.
Time perception and punctuality are extremely important in China, in fact, it may even be
considered a virtue. The country prides its work ethic, which is based on the Confucian Principle
of respect for the elderly and achieving perfection in work, as a key contributor to its status as a
global economic superpower today. The culture firmly believes that excellent work ethics begets

greatness. However, efficiency is one area where Chinese and Ghanaian perceptions often differ.
For local workers, especially those providing unskilled or semi-skilled labor, a lack of clear
communication links with their Chinese employers easily feeds into frustrations stemmed from
differences in expectations. Chinese easily take offense to tardiness, and it is only worse in the
workspace, where time management and efficiency blends into the social awareness of authority,
hierarchy, and the value of respect. A repetitive conversation that occurs in every interview with
Chinese restaurant owners is their annoyance towards tardiness. One owner, W, repeatedly
emphasized his hiring policy: “skinny and young”, both of which boils down to efficiency. “If
they are young, they are more energetic and they will move faster. The same thing goes with
their size. I cannot stand having a fat woman working for my restaurant. They move too slow.”
Contrary to the Chinese work ethic, it is common to arrive 10-15 minutes late for social
functions in the Ghanaian culture. And this attitude often translates to different aspects of one’s
life in Ghana. However, the lack of a common ground, coupled with the difficulty to
communicate effectively, often paves the way for arguments and conflicts. For restaurant A, a
waitress earns about 500 cedis per month (roughly 100 dollars). If they have been on time for
every shift, they earn a 50-cedi bonus. However, if they have had 3 tardiness marked on their
record, they will be fired immediately. “It’s restaurant. It’s a fast business. No one wants to sit
around for 20 minutes before they can start eating. So if I need money to flow in quickly, the
dish has to be on the table quickly.” The owner added.
The failure to reach cross-culture understanding and its equity expectations can, therefore,
be dangerously transformed into racially-framed allegations of each other. Little efforts have
been shown to bridge the gap between Chinese employers and their Ghanaian employees. They
are often caught within their own framework of understanding on work ethics and pervasive

norms and are therefore blind to any cross-cultural adaptation. Accumulated tension and negative
energy can lead to verbalization of discontent or act of destruction that is then ascribed to beyond
just the individual but instead “the Chinese people” or “the Africans”. This eventually leads to a
rise in resentment at a scale much greater than that of the restaurant. A similar concept applies
across other investment sectors as well: Chinese involvement in unlawful and unregulated
activities can be easily rendered into a monolithic trope that is diffused and served to fuel antiChinese populism across the continent.
Then, across the continent, while China takes a large share of the cake of African
technological and socio-economic development, many of its migrant workers are under fire for
mistreatment of local employees. This is not to justify illegal, racially-implied, or unethical
actions committed by Chinese working in Africa, but a way to show how a few significant
events, with the help of an omnipresent media, can effectively shape and develop a specific
stereotype that is even more difficult to deconstruct. That being said, in order to allow successful
and mutually-beneficial engagements on all levels, Chinese people need to be educated on crosscultural/racial interactions while their African counterpart social actors should disrupt and
constrain Chinese enterprises and enact their political and social agency.
Lack of mutual understanding on social relationships
Although China selectively pinpoints target countries that are resource-rich, and
politically and economically stable, made-in-China services and goods permeate the entire
continent. But this process of a Chinese embrace is only accompanied by creeping anti-Chinese
populism, as Africans recognize that cheap labor and financial capital coming from the East
becomes a competitor to local development strategies. Though sentiments of discontent occur
often when foreign labor and capital come from overseas, the case of China is particularly

interesting due to the incentive of some migrant laborers as well as the political climate, social
systems, and social understanding of human interactions of China.
One important aspect that many academic works focusing on a similar topic fail to take
into account is the impact of the Chinese Economic Reform from 1978 to 1993 on the Chinese
economy as well as its job market. It created space for individuals to start private businesses but
also opened China to trade with the rest of the world. Self-established businesses promoted a
strong incentive for individuals to work much more rigorously, but it also severed economic
polarization between the rich and the poor. As market competition intensifies, many desired for
change and tried to find their niche by migrating to countries where competition with fellow
Chinese is less severe.
When efforts towards abridging differences and establishing common ground in terms of
social interactions have not been made, increasing interaction can often turn into conflict. There
is also a residential wedge between Chinese migrants and their host communities that play a role
in the deterioration in social relations between the Chinese foreign nationals and the Ghanaian
locals. The influx of Chinese products creates a fear that it will crowd out opportunities for local
businesses. Language is nestled in work culture, and existing dialogues of anti-Chinese
populism, therefore, become realized and materialized when frustration is bred over a lack of
clear communication links between Ghanaian workers and their Chinese counterparts.
The strict work ethic embedded within the Chinese culture, however, is not the only
source of conflict. Beyond superficial racial and cultural prejudice, the concept of vulnerability
and risk, as Giese and Thiel discussed in their work, indeed play a crucial role in shaping
employment relationship and mutual understanding, or lack thereof. For Chinese employers,
their vulnerability is embedded in the idea of foreignness, and possible victimization of general

social and political conflicts that was established by a small group of Chinese who has
previously committed illegal activities. The formation of this monolithic stereotype contributes
to one’s vulnerability, especially when there exists a risk that their substantial investments and
decisions to leave their home country could be jeopardized. The owner of the restaurant C,
located at the heart of the most popular district of Accra, discussed the frequent incidents of local
food safety authorities coming to “pick problems”. Owner Z said:
“Every time they come, they always try to pick problem. They don’t do it to any other
restaurants on this street. Just us. But really, they are all just here looking to start problems.
They think Chinese is rich, so they really are here for the money. We give them 50 cedis and they
just go away. But if they don’t, they can wipe a countertop and if there’s the slightest dirt they’ll
say it’s a safety violation. All of our seating are outdoors, how do you expect there to not be
dirt?”
To reduce the risk of social conflicts, Chinese employers often turn to their Ghanaian
employees as communication links and a social shield to avoid dealing with issues in an
unfamiliar socio-political context. On the other hand, many do not want to display the sense of
vulnerability outwardly to the public, let alone their employees. When asked why they decided to
move to Ghana out of all places in the world, no Chinese employer participant mentioned seeing
Ghana as a place to significantly financially enrich oneself. This, however, cannot be translated
into those participating in other sectors of the economy such as manufacturing, mining, or
construction because the economic scale of those activities is much greater than that of catering.
Chinese participants working in catering usually do not have a high education level in China. In
fact, 40% of the interviewees began working full-time in China at the age of 16. Most others
only have high school level education. As previously mentioned, as domestic employment and
market competition escalate in mainland China, many look outwards and abroad. They expressed
the sentiment that they would rather be their own boss than working for someone else. But when
asked how long they would want to stay in Ghana before they return home, no one gave an exact

answer. Amazingly, every interviewee mentioned the social disconnect and lack of opportunities
in China that would make lives even more difficult if they return. Therefore, the fear of having
an even bigger set back when returning home and the constant battles with local resentment
could potentially create a greater sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Except for the case of
restaurant A, all other interviewees do not have other familial ties in the country. Many have kids
in China who are being taken care of by external families. Their longing for comfort and the
absence of social and material security is contrasted by their desire to succeed in this country.
Frustrations develop when Ghanaian employees are not meeting expectations; they are
frequently pitted against their Chinese counterparts that the employers have previously
encountered in China, to the extent at which the Ghanaian employees are made to feel inferior.
These fundamental factors -- foreignness, fear, and social-political unfamiliarity -- leave
potential Ghanaian employees at risk of developing distorted perceptions of their Chinese
employers.
While this research aimed to complement previous works that lacked the space to
investigate Chinese employers' standpoint by providing a culturally-grounded empirical analysis,
it is nevertheless crucial to offer a dual-perspective. Therefore, despite the fact that the majority
of the above analysis is honed in from the angle of the Chinese employer, employees' attitude
was still used in this research to compare and contrast both parties' perception on risk and
vulnerability, though they may hold significantly different meanings.

Employee Perspectives
Approaching the interview portion of this research, based on general perceptions and
research hypothesis, I predicted that the anti-Chinese populism would be most prominent
amongst those who work for Chinese employers because the site of interaction would generate

the most crossover emotions. Contrasting the two-sided perspectives of this employment
relations, a diverging vulnerability perception is formed from the employee’s experience as well.
Given Chinese employers’ vulnerability stemming from foreignness, the similar sentiment
amongst Ghanaian employees is derived from the threat of being antagonized, which is often
formed through a lack of cross-cultural understanding, as previously mentioned in the
employers’ perspective discussion. However, misunderstanding could easily be translated into a
racialized public discourse: such that of inhumane employment practices, the same way Chinese
imported goods are denounced as cheap, counterfeit merchandise when other nationals’ imports
of similar qualities are less subjective to this allegation. While I found the sentiment and strength
of this publicized discourse to be especially strong amongst the general public, it is, in fact,
nowhere near as prominent amongst Ghanaian employees working for Chinese employers. The
young Ghanaian employees usually lack both higher education and strong family support
network within close vicinity of their employment site. This is contrasted by Chinese employers
in the catering industry who often are organized by a sojourning group of extended families of
friends, who internally create a social safety net. Therefore, due to a lack of access to other
options to secure their financial and social wellbeing, Ghanaian employees’ high demand for
paid labor puts them in a vulnerable position because they are relatively more dependent on their
employers than vice versa. In a way, employment conflict actually lies beyond that of mere
cultural misunderstanding but commences from both parties’ high demand for security and
loyalty, which are demonstrated insufficiently through symbolic acts. Employee’s desire for
financial stability eventually turns into a form of reliance on their employer, which ultimately
offsets any anti-Chinese populism. During the interview process, all Ghanaian employees
working for Chinese migrant restaurant owners were not vocal about their outlooks on China-

Ghana relations. Instead, they spoke more fluently on their interaction with their bosses. Even so,
they were much more indifferent and neutral about employment relations as opposed to their
Chinese counterparts. “This is my job; I need to earn the money. They’ve been teaching me
Chinese, but I wouldn’t have the job if they weren’t here” said one employee working for
restaurant H. When asked about their perspective on Sino-Ghanaian relations and Chinese
investment in Ghana, the answers across the board were either “I don’t know” or “I don’t think it
is bad”. A major factor contributing to this collectively similar response is what was discussed
earlier: the strong reliance on employers that in turn offsets any negative sentiments, or even a
discomfort and lack of incentive to express any discontent in their workspace, where all
interviews were conducted.
In any case, however, both parties often fail to gain a deeper understanding for each
other that would eventually help smooth the relationship. Beyond culturally grounded
expectations from both parties, what, then, are conducive to racially framed allegations of each
other and disseminate anti-Chinese sentiments within African societies?

Role of Media and Image Perpetuation
Part of this research involved interviewing those that were neither Chinese employers nor
Ghanaian employees as part of a controlled group. This controlled group was selected from
different sectors within the Ghanaian society. One of which, most significantly, was a rural
Ghanaian village two hours away from the city of Kumasi. Interviewees were educated persons
of the village who have never had interactions with Chinese people in Ghana. This interview was
kept semi-structured, guided by lead questions:
“What do you think of when I say the word China?”

“How do you feel about Chinese investments in Ghana?”
“How do you think Ghanaians perceive Chinese foreigners?”
“How do certain understanding of Chinese people get formed in Ghana?”
Collectively, words that describe China included “technology”, “leader”, “biggest
power”, and last not but not least “galamsey”. To the second question, 25% of the participant
echoed their answers to the first question by responding with “opening companies here” or
“providing employment”, “lots of Chinese products”, the rest, expectedly, redirected the
conversation with words such as “cheap goods” “bad quality products” “criminals hide their
money here.'' Those who saw China as a source of employment and development eventually all
addressed certain Chinese’ continued illegal profiting by accessing local vital resources which
incite local anger. One participant at one point mentioned that regardless of unlawful and
unregulated activities, no other country has been able to help Ghana develop directly as China
has been. When the recent $60 billion financial pledges made at the FOCAC was mentioned, one
participant aggressively responded with “Nothing comes for free. But we need to develop, and if
China wants to build roads and buildings here. I guess we just have to close our eyes on the bad
and open on the good to keep going.” Needless to say, though all answers were one-dimensional
considerations, they offered an overall and relatively inclusive perspective to the ongoing
discourse involving the wavering perceptions of Chinese engagement. Whether it’d be cultural
misunderstanding, the absence of a grounded normative framework, residential wedge, local
market threat, or racial ignorance, the emerging anti-China populism in Africa holds critical
implications for China as a rising global power. As much as close proximity and observable
Chinese presence support the growth of such sentiment, media also plays an important role in the
dissemination of related information.

Local media source, coupled with the word-of-mouth phenomenon, speeds up any
information circulation process. For those village participants who have never met a Chinese
person or rarely delve into the multifaceted issue of Chinese investment in Ghana, their reaction
towards the situation is likely to be supported by the way others around them speak of the matter.
For many external parties, particularly Western countries against Chinese economic operations in
Africa, it is not shocking for them to outpour pro-democracy, environmental protection, and
labor rights discussions that put Chinese ventures in Africa as an anecdote of plundering
resources, robbing local economy, and violating human rights. Negative media, therefore only
intensifies anti-Chinese populism on the ground. Knowing this, I purposefully asked certain
participants their perception of Americans/Europeans in Ghana as opposed to Chinese in Ghana.
The most unexpected response I received was “Well, the Americans do not do bad things here.
The Chinese do.” This understanding, without acknowledging its political correctness or
incorrectness, shows the lack of understanding of the economic and political context of foreign
investment in Ghana. Despite not requiring every Ghanaian or Chinese to understand the socioeconomic implications and incentives behind Sino-Ghanaian/Sino-African relations, it is still
necessary to evaluate how local media portrays this bilateral engagement and whether it
contributes to the ongoing Sinophobia across the nation and continent.
The two major local news outlet I have selected are myjoyonline.com and GhanaWeb,
both of which are accessible via the world wide web. In order to analyze the style and topic of
reporting, I simply typed “China” into both search engines and reviewed articles that were
published within the past 12 months in relation to “China”. Within myjoyonline, many articles
discussed the recent Chinese-American trade war, or generally on the topic of globalizing
Chinese development: ranging from oil price adjustments to “launching a fake moon into space”.

There, you see Ghana President Akufo-Addo’s name appear numerous times, emphasizing his
new development agenda that echoes China’s previous development trajectory. The platform
also welcomes many outside voices, most of which are experts in the field who tend to critique
the China's policies or advocates of the potential negative impacts of Chinese investments.
Surprisingly, a few articles also target the strict firewall enforcement in China’s media
accessibility, discussing human rights and rights to information. Nevertheless, most articles
appear to be neutral, quotation based, and do not involve much of the reporters' opinion, unless it
is an interview. GhanaWeb, on the other hand, have more coverage on Chinese-Ghanaian
interaction as opposed to neutral reporting on China’s activities as done by myjoyonline.com.
However, a major difference is that GhanaWeb symbolically use Chinese investment in Ghana to
represent metaphorically, on several occasions, pessimism and hopelessness especially in reports
reflecting on Ghana’s financial future. This turns the bi-national economic engagement into a
figure of speech with a negative connotation. This pessimism was a running trend throughout the
interviews of this research, particularly apparent among those that do not have direct interactions
with Chinese investment in Ghana. Though view counts was not accessible from the website, the
number of comments left on articles that discussed Chinese-Ghanaian conflict tripled other
articles on Sino-Ghanian relations. This is a direct reflection on what the mainstream audience
tend to “cherry-pick” from the overall discourse of Chinese investment in Ghana.
Overall, there is a large contrast between the number of articles and topics of discussion
within major media outlets and the ones that the audience tend to chew over. There is a lack of
opinion columns by experts in the field which creates spaces for the readers to interpret and form
their own opinions. However, the little opinion columns that do exist are often single sided, thus
also persuading the public to achieve a particular perception of China that is only reinforced by

the word-of-mouth phenomenon. Although not extremely prominent, the trend in style of
reporting within major media outlets in Ghana nevertheless have the potential and influence to
sway popular conception on a particular issue. This, in combination with the steadily increasing
business presence in Ghana, have the tendency to traverse the conflict zones and encounter local
anti-Chinese sentiments.

Research Findings
China, in comparison to previous Western powers, look to Ghana to offer an alternative
model of development that prioritizes stability over democracy and promotes market
mechanisms and commercial relations. As Chinese presence grows exponentially within the
recent decade, global media often shine their spotlight on massive infrastructure or
manufacturing projects. However, little research has been done on the one million Chinese
migrant workers in Africa working for SMEs that inevitably create a direct link of import-export
trade between the two countries. This research focuses on the service and catering sector, which
provides direct and accessible way for the two cultures of people to interact. Employer-employee
conflicts recently have become a popular topic of discussion within local media and this research
delves into examining the factors that contribute to conflict within this cross-cultural
relationship. In essence, lack of grounded cultural understanding such as punctuality and work
ethics, coupled with language barriers, create conflict that can be easily reiterated into racially
framed allegations. However, the recycling of this social relationship is constructed on the basis
of vulnerability and risk where both parties inter-rely on each other without vocally expressing
their needs or loyalty to each other. Chinese employers migrated to Ghana seeking a better life to
escape domestic business competitions and to have more authority in their social enterprises,
whereas Ghanaian employees look at Chinese employers as the provider of their financial well-

being. In facing pre-existing social perceptions and judgement, Chinese employers look to their
Ghanaian employees as an easy pawn to increase their social mobility and capital within this
foreign space. Media, which holds the power to magnify certain aspects of specific issues and
broadcast them to the general public, therefore becomes the generator of the wavering
perceptions of Chinese people in Ghana, and it has control over which single-sided perception to
expose. Though operating on small-scale interactions, Chinese SMEs are important to investigate
in the grand scheme of Sino-Ghanaian relations as it is the most observable, on-the-ground
interactions between the two cultures of people and it is the most relatable to the average
Ghanaian. In bridging the gap of misunderstanding, criticism, and conflict, this research hopes to
provide grounds behind the cause of conflict and help pave a more stable path towards future
Sino-Ghanaian engagement. It also leaves space and questions for future research: What is the
future of small-scale migrant Chinese workers in Ghana? How can African countries adequately
prepare for any unforeseen economic or political repercussions that come with the massive influx
of financial assistance from China? Will developmental alignment to global superpowers ever be
ended for African nations to develop on their own, or collectively as a whole?
CONCLUSION
Beyond Conflict and Criticism, Bridging the Gap
Opinions on China-Africa relations differ among observers. While no one really can
break down China’s ultimate incentive behind such a large influx of infrastructure and aid
projects, contending arguments might help to navigate understandings. Some insist that China’s
claim of this mutually beneficial, win-win situation is a hoax mainly to provide a solution for
China’s domestic unemployment situation based on the country’s large import of its own
workforce in projects. On the other hand, others speculate that China’s “going out” policy

encourages Chinese entrepreneurs to seek opportunities abroad and African countries happen to
be the most qualified recipients in their opinion. Needless to say, some oversee the pre-existing
economic power dynamics that place African locals inferior to Chinese entrepreneurs, and
China’s exploration in Ghana’s informal economic sector drives competition between foreign
and domestic entrepreneurs, and this tends to create conflict and accentuates the unbalanced
power dynamic between both parties.
As previously discussed, China’s historical economic reform in 1978 strongly targeted
the country’s state-owned enterprises. These firms were granted managerial autonomy in
developing and enhancing market-oriented businesses. As Kernan and Lam discussed in their
academic article, financially profitable businesses were absorbed into new SOE subsidiaries and
social burdens and debt were trapped within original SOE while subsidiaries continued to grow
their profitable business. The continuous poor performances led to a new policy initiated in 1996
to “keep the large and let go of the small” (Kernan and Lam 2014:1055). Letting go of the small
meant that other than the largest SOEs, most were sold or undergone processes that transferred
its status to be under the provision of provincial governments, making the role of the “state” in
“state-owned enterprises” much less significant. Therefore, financial and political support from
the state is also greatly diminished, thus increasing many SOEs’ intentions to stay in Africa and
not continue to develop in their home country. Essentially, while many still think that Chinese
SOE’s are directly linked and operated by the Chinese government, most in this case are not.
However, this common misconception creates a direct impact on the rise of sinophobia as any
wrongdoings committed by Chinese companies, of any scale but mostly those operating in larger
dimensions, will expectedly falsely reflect the criminality of the Chinese government.

African Rising: Agency and Strategy in Dealing with China

Then, can we offer a coherent and structured plan that successfully bridges gaps and
enhances Africa’s political, social, and economic ties with China? Across different sectors of
engagement: economic (trade and investment), development (assistance), education, and labor,
China proves to offer a completely different development strategy that Africa’s previous
development partners. Therefore, given the successes and failures of previous interactions, the
continent as a whole need to be more aggressive in promoting equal footing, needs, and respect
for national sovereignty. This calls for responsive leadership that can separate and prioritize
national goals before personal interests. It also requires a deep understanding of the social
structure that can effectively develop a style of governance that is not directly copied and pasted
from Western-style democracy. Though China’s ultimate goal of heavy investment is not
transparent to the rest of the world, its strategy and policy are clear. African countries should be
united and collectively interact with China with a unified policy. China’s overall development
plan oversees Africa as a whole, and not each African country individually, though there are
independent national projects that are distinct from each other. When each African country
pursues the Sino-African relation based on their own needs and development agenda, their
overall bargaining power weakens and positive effects of Chinese investment become diluted.
Specifically, the informal sector of the economy needs to be strengthened since they are the least
represented and face the harshest competition over other sectors. As this research suggests,
private migrants and investments look for more long-term relations with Africa based on the
nature of the interaction and a mutually-dependent relationship, however, their African
counterparts do not show as much incentive, or are not as politically and economically motivated
by the government. To minimize the gap, the development agenda uniquely targeting China

should be strengthened and implemented uniformly across the continent to absorb maximum
benefit.
Lastly, there needs to be more consciousness and attention paid to the differences
between Chinese investment projects. Exerting pressure to differentiate and separate investment
and loans from interest-free loans and aid projects will not only help to formulate policies, but
they also uplift stress responsibility delegation and promote transparency, and counteract
domestic corruption.
In order to bridge gaps of misunderstanding and conflict between China and African
countries, China needs to be more aware of cross-cultural understanding and be prepared to
adapt to the socio-cultural nuances of various African countries. But equally important, African
counterparts need to be more unified in analyzing and responding to Chinese investment
decisions. This agency not only comes from the top-down but also bottom-up as well, and it
starts with those like the Ghanaian participants of this research. Reinserting African agency into
dominant discourse of China-in-Africa means to make Sino-African relationships more locally
driven and publicly recognized. Development should not be a subscription-based connection
grounded on value alignment, but a complete understanding of historical and current context as
well as the relations between all factors
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